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 D. Sedley’s piece, though focussed on Hesiod’s inﬂ uence on the Timaeus, could 
well have acted as a prelude to the entire volume. He sets elements of the Theogony 
against the cosmogony of the Timaeus, looking in particular at the implications 
of apparent parallels between Hesiod’s Chaos and Plato’s receptacle. His broader 
methodological point is made clear in his conclusion: ‘future discussions of the 
Hesiodic and Timaean cosmogonies are likely to be enriched if we address the 
same questions to both in parallel’ (p. 258). The other articles demonstrate that 
such potential riches are by no means restricted to the realm of cosmogony.
 M. Regali looks at another speciﬁ c point of interaction between the Timaeus and 
Hesiod. R. reads the Demiurge’s address to the lesser gods at Timaeus 41a7–d3 
as inviting comparison with the proem to the Works and Days and, in particular, 
with the ﬁ gure of Zeus. Again, the emphasis is on the fact that Plato is seeking 
both to incorporate and to challenge Hesiodic authority.
 Two essays are illustrative of the fact that such intertextual readings are, in the 
end, likely to increase the complexity of interpreting Plato, rather than simplify 
it. This is, of course, no bad thing. Both D. El Murr and C. Rowe investigate 
Hesiodic inﬂ uence on the notoriously difﬁ cult myth of the Age of Kronos in the 
Statesman. But whereas El M. ﬁ nds that the Golden Age imagery of Hesiod and 
others (notably the Attic comedians) provides support for a traditional reading of 
Plato’s myth as presenting two stages of cosmic development, R. ﬁ nds that particular 
points of contact with Hesiod’s version bolster the case for his preferred three-stage 
reading.
 The essays in this volume are all original, interesting and, in most cases, pro-
vocative (in a good way), even though several essays frustratingly conclude that 
Plato had a complicated and subtle interest in Hesiod, and that he wanted to appeal 
to his authority and to challenge it. I should have liked to see more attempts along 
the lines of those made by Van Noorden, Pender and El Murr (among others) to 
push such readings to the next stage and to investigate the philosophical implica-
tions of such a relationship.
University College London JENNY BRYAN
jenny.bryan@ucl.ac.uk
PLATO’S THEAETETUS
ST E R N (P.) Knowledge and Politics in Plato’s Theaetetus. Pp. x + 315. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Cased, £58, US$97.99. 
ISBN: 978-0-521-88429-7.
doi:10.1017/S0009840X10001915
The purpose of S.’s monograph is ‘to give full weight to the political substance’ 
of the Theaetetus: Plato’s treatment of knowledge (and of why knowledge is a 
problem) ‘can only be properly understood through careful attention to the dia-
logue’s political character’ (p. 1). According to S. ‘the dialogue’s surface poses 
the connection between politics and the meaning of knowledge as a question’, but 
commentators have been reluctant to engage with this question (p. 4). S. wants 
to remedy this state of affairs by offering a complex narrative which purports to 
identify the varied ways in which the themes of human individuality, the complexity 
of the soul and its passions, goodness and ‘the political’ are central concerns of 
the Theaetetus, indeed prior to, and foundational for an answer to, the ostensible 
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question ‘what is knowledge?’ S. pursues this agenda with some ingenuity, but 
also with a frustrating single-mindedness which is almost ‘ideological’, to borrow a 
term which S. himself uses repeatedly, and misleadingly, with reference to Socrates’ 
interlocutors and adversaries. ‘When the philosopher neglects the pretheoretical 
context’, S. complains, ‘what results is not philosophy but ideology’ (p. 191); what 
S. seems to do, repeatedly, is to neglect or distort the primary context of Plato’s 
own text in order to squeeze it into the framework of his pre-constituted theory.
 The structure of the book mirrors the unfolding of the dialogue, from the pro-
logue (Chapter 2) to the conclusion (Chapter 10), with more sustained discussion 
of the ﬁ rst part, including the self-portrait of Socrates as an intellectual midwife 
(Chapter 3), the ‘delivery’ and assessment of Theaetetus’ ﬁ rst deﬁ nition of knowl-
edge (Chapters 4, 5 and 7), and the so-called ‘digression’ (Chapter 6). The analysis 
of Theaetetus’ second and third deﬁ nitions and of the falsehood puzzles (Chapters 
7 and 8) is more restricted.
 S.’s analysis of the prologue sets the tone of the book, and will serve as a useful 
illustration of some of its shortcomings. S. is right to notice that the importance 
of the prologue has too often been overlooked, and that a satisfactory philosophi-
cal understanding of the Theaetetus should take into serious account the elusive 
signiﬁ cance of the dialogue’s dramatic details. But S.’s reconstruction of the key 
role of the prologue is an explosive mix of (1) groundless assertions, (2) imprecise 
readings of the text and (3) strained over-interpretations. To limit ourselves to 
some examples, (1) S. provides no evidence for his repeated censure of Euclides’ 
‘mediocrity’ and ‘intellectual limitations’ (p. 16). (2) S.’s narrative of Euclides’ 
account of how he came to write down the dialogue goes well beyond anything 
written by Plato: there is no indication at all in the text that Socrates ﬁ rst related 
his conversation with Theodorus and Theaetetus in successive stints while awaiting 
execution, or that Euclides would later show Socrates his ‘work in progress’ during 
numerous visits to Socrates’ cell (p. 15), with Socrates minutely ‘overseeing the 
production of a written manuscript’, thus effectively writing a valedictory conver-
sation which he took ‘steps to preserve and so make available to others’ (p. 30). 
If we read the prologue at face value, Socrates could very well have not even 
known that Euclides had undertaken writing down the conversation. (3) S. interprets 
Euclides’ editorial choice of direct dialogue, which eliminates the ‘temporal context 
preserved by narrativity’, as a poisonous consequence of Megarian metaphysics, 
which paradoxically denies the reality of change and particularity (pp. 17–23). But 
one could argue with equal force that direct dialogues are more vividly faithful to 
the actual practice of conversation than indirect ones, which ‘freeze’ the conversa-
tion in the narrator’s time and perspective. And, anyway, how is the condemnation 
of this dialogical form as unphilosophical to be reconciled with Plato’s adoption 
of it in so many of his works (and with Socrates’ alleged editorial oversight)?
 Similar shortcomings mar S.’s potentially fruitful emphasis on the signiﬁ cance 
of characterisation. As a result of what is often nothing more than wildly anach-
ronistic psychologising, the familiar characters Theodorus and Theaetetus become 
unrecognisable in S.’s hands. For example, Theodorus’ apparently innocuous choice 
of the image of ‘a stream of oil ﬂ owing effortlessly’ to describe his pupil’s out-
standing character manifests Theodorus’ exaggerated (almost ‘tyrannical’, p. 55) 
‘desire for a wholly unimpeded life’, and his lack of grasp on the complexity of 
the intelligible object (a human soul) he is trying to depict (p. 44). This is one 
aspect of Theodorus’ damning ‘self-forgetfulness’, his wilful obliviousness to the 
limitations of his technical knowledge (p. 47) and his anti-Socratic and quasi-
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sophistic leanings (p. 86) which S. reads between the lines of Plato’s dialogue. 
According to S., Theaetetus shares some of the same defects: his perplexity about, 
and interest in, the Socratic question ‘what is knowledge?’, which is enthusiastically 
saluted by Socrates, actually reveals a fatherless ‘adolescent boy in some degree 
of psychological conﬂ ict’ (p. 98), and the ‘struggle’ which ‘rages between the 
passions moving him sometimes nearer to, sometimes farther from, the Socratic 
life’; Theaetetus is animated by a certain ‘counter-Socratic passion that prevented 
him from becoming Socrates’ student’ (p. 65) and attracted him, instead, towards 
Theodorus’ rival model of certain technical knowledge (a ‘yearning for certainty 
produced by his desire for honor’ [p. 91] and power). S.’s tendentious portrait of 
these characters reﬂ ects, unsurprisingly, a number of disputable and unsubstantiated 
driving hypotheses which determine it. For example, S.’s description of Theaetetus 
as ‘poised between mathematics and dialectic’ (p. 78), that is between the illusory 
realm of self-sufﬁ cient certainty and the realm of continual philosophical inquiry 
which rejects certainty as a genuine criterion of knowledge (p. 161), ﬂ ies in the 
face of the Platonic educational model in which mathematics is not a rival of, but 
is propaedeutic to, dialectic, and hints at a view of Plato’s conception of knowledge 
which is as alien and problematic as any. Not surprisingly, S. is almost silent on 
the metaphysics and epistemology of the central books of the Republic; his quick 
reference to the distinction between epistêmê and doxa in those books, in order to 
support his own translation of doxa as ‘opinion’ on the grounds that doxa has the 
sense ‘partial knowledge’ (p. 216 n. 1), is quite telling about S.’s shaky epistemo-
logical grounds.
 The analysis of the ‘digression’ in Chapter 6 is arguably the core of the book, 
in which S.’s take on the political theme emerges most clearly and contentiously. 
According to S., ‘Socrates not only roundly demeans the orator-politicians’, as 
we all know; ‘also the Philosopher comes in for a share of criticism’, since he is 
depicted ‘as other-worldly and apolitical, ignorant, or neglectful of the transitory, 
particular, and so, trivial affairs of humans’ (p. 163). The Socratic life, with its 
‘concern for what is good, beautiful, and just’ is opposed to both kinds of life, 
thus being really political and (thereby) really philosophical. It is undeniable that 
there are striking differences between Socrates himself and the Philosopher of the 
digression, which Plato clearly asks us to reﬂ ect upon. But S.’s contention that 
Socrates ‘makes emphatically clear that he regards the Philosopher’s neglect of 
politics as a grave error’ is poorly supported: the point that the Philosopher does 
not even know that he does not know the petty affairs of his fellow citizens is 
clearly meant to evoke Socratic self-knowledge as exercised on more important 
matters, but I cannot see any reason why that lack of self-knowledge should 
condemn the Philosopher to a damning ‘lack of insight into his soul’ (p. 165), or 
into the human soul and goodness more generally, pace S. Even more striking is 
S.’s assertion that what we learn in the digression is that ‘that which is good … 
is so in relationship to some need. There is no good in itself. Rather, by “good” 
we should mean “good for” someone’, which requires us to delve into the com-
plexities of political life (p. 175). This complete reversal of what the ‘digression’ 
has taught intelligent Platonic readers for more than two thousand years is almost 
as surprising as S.’s claim that the error of ‘those like Theaetetus’ is to ‘long for 
pure knowledge of the pure good’, for ‘wholes that are homogeneously what they 
are through and through’, while actually ‘knowledge relies on the ﬂ uctuating, less 
knowable, particulars’ (pp. 205–7). S. must be confusing knowledge itself with the 
often (or always) partial grasp of it that human beings achieve (and the complex 
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process leading to that approximation): of course the reality of the latter by no 
means implies the intrinsically ‘aspirational, and therefore partial, character of 
knowledge’ itself (p. 210). S.’s idiosyncratic reading requires him to postulate that 
only at 176a8 the discussion turns ﬁ nally to Socratic philosophy, as opposed to the 
objectionable Philosopher’s approach previously criticised (p. 176); once again, this 
is devoid of any textual grounds, and the key theme of homiôsis theôi is seriously 
underplayed by S. The fact that the god-like existence to which philosophers aspire 
is not depicted in traditional terms does not mean that the initial idea of ‘becoming 
like a god’ is now reinterpreted as, and replaced by, the more political Socratic 
ideal of ‘becoming just and holy with phronesis’ (p. 177); it rather reﬂ ects Plato’s 
well-known revision of the misguided traditional conception of the divine, which 
is re-identiﬁ ed with the other-worldly measure of virtue and goodness to which 
philosophers strive to conform (without any self-deceiving ‘pretense that they are 
gods’, p. 248, pace S.).
 S. lets his exegesis of the Theaetetus be thoroughly dictated by his grand inter-
pretative scheme even when dealing with the most technical and ‘epistemological’ 
sections. To mention only one example, in his discussion of the falsehood puzzles 
S. suggests that the irreducible and complex individuality, ‘the otherness of the 
beings’, for which ‘any particular being is not only this but also other than this’ 
is what ‘provides a foundation for falsehood … insofar as any characterization of 
one of them will be partial’ (pp. 232–3). This is not only well beyond anything 
written or suggested in the dialogue, but also blatantly false: granted, Plato is 
not only handsome, but also Greek and a philosopher; but if I judge that ‘Plato 
is handsome’, the fact that my judgement does not capture the whole truth and 
complexity about Plato does not imply that I am thereby judging falsely.
 Original approaches to Plato’s dialogues will always be welcome, and reconstruc-
tion of the political undercurrents of some key passages of the Theaetetus is not 
a project to be condemned a priori on the prejudice that the dialogue is ‘about 
epistemology’. But S.’s execution of this project is unsatisfactory: S. vastly over-
emphasises the weight of politics in the economy of the dialogue, and too often 
over-interprets, misinterprets or simply ignores details of Plato’s text to appease 
the demands of his hypotheses, a strategy typically backed by weak argument or 
no argument at all. Moreover, those hypotheses are not formulated with sufﬁ cient 
clarity: S. operates with a conception of ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ that is too 
vague to be serviceable, apparently encompassing whatever has to do with human 
beings, ethics, moral psychology, intellectual development and politics proper. The 
problematic status of S.’s Theaetetus within the broader context of Plato’s corpus is 
left unexplored; one can only wonder what kind of epistemological and metaphysi-
cal reading S. would offer for some key Platonic texts if they had to be attuned to 
his approach to the Theaetetus. Despite the major ﬂ aws of this book, specialists will 
learn something useful from S.’s sometimes ingenious readings of speciﬁ c passages, 
and perhaps even more from the methodological reﬂ ection and self-reﬂ ection that 
will inevitably be provoked as a reaction to S.’s controversial approach. But less 
advanced students of ancient philosophy or the history of political thought will 
ﬁ nd too much that is groundless, tendentious or simply incorrect in S.’s book for 
it to serve as an introductory reading worth recommending.
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